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Understanding Phenomena
Christoph Kelp∗
Abstract
The literature on the nature of understanding can be divided
into two broad camps. Explanationists believe that it is knowl-
edge of explanations that is key to understanding. In contrast,
their manipulationist rivals maintain that understanding essen-
tially involves an ability to manipulate certain representations.
The aim of this paper is to provide a novel knowledge based
account of understanding. More specifically, it proposes an ac-
count of maximal understanding of a given phenomenon in
terms of fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected
knowledge of it and of degrees of understanding in terms of
approximations to such knowledge. It is completed by a con-
textualist semantics for outright attributions of understanding
according to which an attribution of understanding is true of
one just in case one knows enough about it to perform some
contextually determined task. It is argued that this account has
an edge over both its explanationist and manipulationist com-
petitors.
1 Introduction
It is often said that scientific inquiry aims at understanding various
phenomena in the world. For instance, inquiry into the physics of
gases aims at understanding the physics of gases and inquiry into the
evolution of species at understanding the evolution of species. It is
somewhat surprising, then, that the question of what understanding
actually involves has for the longest time not been at the forefront of
research in the philosophy of science. Fortunately, however, this lack
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has recently been started to be supplied as there has been a increase
of interest in the nature of scientific understanding.
It is fair to say that two camps can be distinguished in the liter-
ature. First, there are what I will call ‘explanationists’, who claim
that understanding in essence involves knowledge of correct expla-
nations [Hempel 1965, Salmon 1984, Khalifa 2012, 2013]. To take
a popular example, to understand why planes fly involves know-
ing a correct explanation of why planes fly, for instance, in terms
of Bernoulli’s principle. Second, there are the ‘manipulationists’ ac-
cording to whom understanding involves a specific kind of ability on
the part of the cognitive agent, roughly, an ability to perform (cer-
tain kinds of) manipulations of (certain kinds of) representations of
the phenomena understood [de Regt & Dieks 2005, de Regt 2009a,b,
Grimm 2006, 2014, Wilkenfeld 2013].
In what follows, I look at a recent argument by Peter Lipton and
argue the upshot of this argument is that the above conceptions over-
intellectualise understanding (§2). Colloquially speaking, that means
that they are making understanding a much more highbrow affair
than it actually is. I will then look at ways in which manipulationists
and explanationists might respond to Lipton’s argument and argue
that they remain unsatisfactory (§§3,4). Finally, I will offer a new ac-
count of understanding that avoids the problems of its competitors
(§5).
2 Lipton’s Argument
In a paper aptly entitled ‘Understanding Without Explanation’ Lip-
ton convincingly argues that it is possible to acquire understanding
of some phenomenon without acquiring an explanation of it. Lip-
ton first distinguishes between explanations on the one hand and the
cognitive benefits of explanations on the other. He then identifies un-
derstanding a phenomenon with having the cognitive benefits of an
explanation of it and distinguishes between four types of cognitive
benefits an explanation may offer: knowledge of (i) causal informa-
tion, (ii) necessity, (iii) possibility and (iv) unification [Lipton 2009:
43-4]. In order to show that one can have understanding without ex-
planations, he argues that one can come to enjoy these benefits of ex-
planation without at the same time coming to have an explanation of
the relevant phenomenon. More specifically, he adduces four cases in
each of which the agent comes by one of the above-mentioned types
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of benefits without at the same time acquiring an explanation of the
phenomenon at issue.
For the purposes of this paper, I would like to focus on one of
Lipton’s cases which involves knowledge of necessity without ex-
planation. Lipton considers an agent who comes to know that it is
impossible for gravitational acceleration to be dependent on mass by
appreciating Galileo’s famous thought experiment in which a heavy
and a light mass are tied together. Intuitively, the agent comes to
understand why gravitational acceleration is independent from mass
here. At the same time, the agent does not acquire to knowledge of
an explanation of why this must be so. The reason Lipton gives for
this is that an explanation would have to offer “direct answer” to the
question why acceleration is independent of mass, which the thought
experiment does not provide. More specifically, Lipton suggests that
“to explain by showing necessity requires a kind of constructive ar-
gument that not all proofs or thought experiments supply.”1 It is not
hard to see that it is precisely constructive arguments that will en-
able their possessors to give direct answers to the relevant questions
that are required by explanation. Crucially, however, arguments by
reductio ad absurdum do not qualify as constructive in the relevant
sense. Since Galileo’s thought experiment offers at best a reductio ad
absurdum of the proposition that mass and acceleration are not inde-
pendent, it does not serve to explain why they are independent.2
The upshot of Lipton’s argument for explanationist accounts of
understanding is obvious. Given that one can understand a phe-
nomenon without having an explanation of it, explanationist accounts
of understanding are too demanding. More specifically, it seems
plausible that the problem explanationism faces here is one of overin-
1 Lipton [2009: 47]. I take it that Lipton’s theses (i) that explanations must
offer direct answers to the relevant why questions and (ii) that explanations by
showing necessity require constructive arguments constitute constraints that any
satisfactory account of explanation (by showing necessity) will have to satisfy. As
a result, his argument will go through on any viable account of explanation.
2 [Lipton 2009: 47-8]. Note, first, that Lipton argues that the situation is analo-
gous in the case of mathematical proofs which also allows for a distinction between
explanatory and non-explanatory proofs. Here, too, Lipton is attracted by the idea
that proofs by reductio are not explanatory. Second, those who are not convinced by
this particular case may recall that Lipton offers three other cases of understanding
without explanation. To those who remain unmoved by all of them, I’d say that the
onus is on them to show why. Finally, third, for the purposes of this paper, I can
in principle allow that understanding requires knowledge of explanations. What
does matter is that non-explanatory knowledge can improve one’s understanding
of a given phenomenon (why will become clear in §5.)
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tellectualisation. The intellectual demands they place on understand-
ing—knowledge of an explanation—are unrealistically high. Less so-
phisticated cognitive achievements can qualify as understanding.
What is perhaps less obvious is that Lipton’s argument also af-
fects certain manipulationist accounts. Thus take the perhaps most
famous version of manipulationism, which was first stated by Henk
de Regt and Dennis Dieks [2005] and was subsequently developed
by de Regt [2009a, 2009b]. The core idea here is that a phenomenon,
P, is understood scientifically if and only if there exists an intelligible
scientific theory, T, of it, where T is intelligible for scientists if they
can recognise qualitatively characteristic consequences of T without
performing exact calculations [de Regt 2009a: 593-4].
Now consider again Lipton’s case of Galileo’s thought experi-
ment. Does someone who appreciates the point of the thought ex-
periment thereby come by a theory of the relation between gravita-
tional acceleration and mass? The answer to this question is very
plausibly no. At the very best, Galileo’s thought experiment affords
us a constraint on theories of this relation. In fact, it is plausible that
a theory of the phenomenon would enable one to give just the kind
of constructive argument that Lipton points out Galileo’s thought ex-
periment fails to offer. Given that this is so, not only can one acquire
understanding without knowing an explanation. One can also ac-
quire understanding without possessing a theory of the phenomenon
understood. In consequence, de Regt and Dieks’s account of under-
standing is bound to fall prey to the overintellectualisation objection
also.3
3 Manipulationism
3.1 Wilkenfeld’s Representation Manipulationism
We have now seen that the most prominent version of manipulation-
ism falls prey to the very same overintellectualisation problem that
its explanationist rivals also encountered. The difficulty for de Regt
and Dieks is that one can acquire understanding of a phenomenon
even when one does not have a theory of it. The theory requirement
de Regt and Dieks place on understanding is too strong.
3 I take it that there is little mileage in the idea that Galileo’s understanding
of the independence of gravitational acceleration and mass is not scientific, if only
because Lipton’s example is taken from the history of science.
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With this point in play, it is not hard to see what sort of move
manipulationists would have to make in order to rescue the account:
they need to drop the theory requirement on understanding. This is
the line taken in a recent paper by Daniel Wilkenfeld who proposes
to replace the theory requirement by the following ‘mental represen-
tation’ requirement:
(A) In order to understand some object x, a thinker must
possess a mental representation of x.
[Wilkenfeld 2013: 1003]
There is reason to think that this move is exactly what is needed in
order to deal with the overintellectualisation worry. After all, while a
theory is a kind of mental representation, not every mental represen-
tation is a theory. It is worth noting that, in line with this observa-
tion, Wilkenfeld offers a very minimal characterisation of the notion
of mental representation according to which mental representations
“are computational structures with content that are susceptible to
mental transformations.”4
Wilkenfeld goes on to incorporate (A), the mental representation
requirement on understanding, into the following manipulationist
account of understanding:
URM (Understanding as Representation Manipulability):
A statement, attributed in context C, that thinker T under-
stands object o, is true if and only if T possesses a men-
tal representation R of o that T could (in counterfactuals
salient in C) modify in small ways to produce R’, where
R’ is a representation of o and possession of R’ enables ef-
ficacious (according to standards relevant in C) inferences
pertaining to, or manipulations, of o.
[Wilkenfeld 2013: 1003-4]
There are two crucial aspects to URM. First and foremost, to under-
stand a phenomenon (or in Wilkenfeld’s terminology ‘object’) is to
have a mental representation of it that one is able to modify in such
a way as to enable one to manipulate or make relevant inferences
4 [Wilkenfeld 2013: 1003]. It has been argued that the very notion of mental
representation is problematic [e.g. van Fraassen 2008]. Of course, it will be bad
news for Wilkenfeld if there is a problem already with the central notion of his
account. However, for present purposes, I will not take a stance on this issue and
so will not pursue this line against Wilkenfeld.
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about the phenomenon. What counts as an ability to modify a rep-
resentation in the relevant way? In Wilkenfeld’s application of URM
to particular cases, it becomes clear that at the very least one must be
able to correct small errors in one’s representation or put it to use to
new cases [Wilkenfeld 2013: §3.1].
Second, URM offers a contextualist semantics for attributions of
understanding. As Wilkenfeld points out, attributions of understand-
ing are plausibly context sensitive. To take an extreme case, one
and the same agent may be attributed understanding of a phenome-
non—the geography of Scotland, say—in a context of primary school
teachers discussing pupil performance in a recent exam, but would
have to be denied understanding in a context in which members of
a search committee discuss whom to hire for a recently advertised
professorship in geography [Wilkenfeld 2013: 1007].
To see that this account avoids the overintellectualisation worry
that de Regt and Dieks encountered, let’s return once more to Lip-
ton’s case of Galileo’s thought experiment. Even if the person who
understands the independence of gravitational acceleration and mass
via this thought experiment need not thereby have a theory of the
phenomenon, he nonetheless does have a mental representation of
it, to wit, the two connected masses falling. Moreover, it is plausi-
ble that his understanding here involves the ability to produce small
modifications of the representation—e.g. viewing them as one mass
vs. viewing them as two masses—which in turn enable him to infer a
contradiction from the hypothesis that gravitational acceleration and
mass are dependent. Thus, it would seem that the retreat to the kind
of representation manipulability account of understanding will give
manipulationists exactly what they need to avoid the overintellectu-
alisation charge.
3.2 . . . In Trouble
Even so, there remain problems for Wilkenfeld’s account. To begin
with, it would seem that the notion of representation that is core to
URM is too inclusive. Suppose T invents a story about the evolution
of the Indian elephant according to which its evolutionary ancestors
were a species of marine pygmy elephants that used to live at the
bottom of the Indian ocean. Suppose T’s story is very detailed and,
thanks to the powers of her imagination, she is able to manipulate
it in various ways and to correct small errors in it. (We may even
suppose that T’s story happens to be entirely accurate. Incredible as
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we may find it, the Indian elephant did in fact evolve from a species
of marine pygmy elephant that inhabited the bottom of the Indian
Ocean.) Now we have a situation in which our thinker, T, has a
representation of the evolution of the Indian elephant, viz. the story
she invented. Moreover, T is able to modify this representation in
ways that enable her to perform an impressive range of the kinds of
inferences and manipulations required by URM. At the same time,
it would seem that T’s story has done nothing to advance her un-
derstanding of the evolution of the Indian elephant.5 These consid-
erations suggest that the notion of a manipulable representation is
too liberal to constitute an appropriate basis for an account of under-
standing.
A different worry concerns the core manipulationist idea—that
understanding requires the ability to manipulate representations, or
perhaps a species thereof—more directly. To bring it out, consider a
cognitive agent, O, who is omniscient. O knows everything there is
to know. Intuitively, O will also be omni-understanding in the sense
that O understands every phenomenon there is to understand. It is
conceivable that O, while omniscient, is entirely passive, an unmov-
ing knower, as it were. In particular, he does not draw inferences,
make predictions, or manipulate his representations in any other way.
(Of course, he knows which propositions can be inferred from which
other propositions, which propositions warrant certain predictions,
etc. However, he never makes those inferences or predictions. Notice
also that this would make sense anyway. After all, he already knows
the results of these inferences, predictions, etc. So there would be
no need for any of this.) In fact, we may assume that O is passive
not as a matter of pure happenstance, but because he does not even
5 If this isn’t immediately obvious, suppose T is also a biology professor and
goes on to include her new theory in her lecture on the Indian elephant, if only as
an alternative to the standard theory. If her story did advance her own understand-
ing of the evolution of the Indian elephant, we may suppose that it will position
students to advance their understanding of this phenomenon as well. Since it is
plausible that a central aim of biology lectures is to position students to advance
their understanding of various biological phenomena (cf. §1), her including her
theory in the lecture contributes towards attaining a central aim of the lecture. As
a result, we should have no qualms about her including her new theory in the
lecture. However, this is not the case. On the contrary, we would find it entirely
unacceptable for her to include her new theory in her lecture. Why? The plau-
sible answer is that her theory does not contribute towards attaining any of the
aims of a biology lecture because it simply does position anyone to improve their
understanding of the evolution of the Indian elephant.
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have the ability to draw inferences, make predictions, or manipulate
his representations. Even so, it remains plausible that since that O is
omniscient, he is also omni-understanding in the relevant sense. If
this is correct, then understanding does, of course, not require the
ability to manipulate (species of) representations.
4 Explanationism
The classical form of explanationism (CE) can avoid both of these
problems of URM. To see this recall that, according to CE, under-
standing is knowledge of correct explanations. Unlike Wilkenfeld’s
URM, this view places much stricter requirements on the kind of
representation that constitutes understanding: understanding is a
species of knowledge. This allows CE to avoid the problem of the
imaginer, T, who imagines a certain situation and perhaps explana-
tions pertaining to it. After all, imagining an explanation is one thing,
knowing it is another. Moreover, unlike manipulationism in general,
CE encounters no difficulties with the case of the omniscient but pas-
sive agent, O. Since O is omniscient he knows all the correct expla-
nations there are to know. Given that understanding is knowledge of
correct explanations, by CE, O also understands every phenomenon
there is to understand. CE can accommodate the intuition that om-
niscient cognisers, even when passive, are also omni-understanding
without further difficulties.
That said, Lipton’s cases of understanding without explanation
continue to constitute a problem for the view. Perhaps, however, the
problem can be solved. Perhaps there is a way of modifying the view
that retains both the spirit and the benefits of CE whilst not falling
prey to Lipton’s counterexamples. In a recent 2013 paper Kareem
Khalifa presents a view that promises to achieve just this. In the
remainder of this section I will first sketch Khalifa’s view and then
outline some problems the view encounters.
4.1 Khalifa’s Explanatory Idealism
Khalifa’s core idea is that knowledge of correct explanations is not
required for understanding. Rather explanations—or, to be more
precise, correct and good explanations—constitute the ideal of un-
derstanding. According to this view, explanations set the standard
for understanding in the sense that the degree of (non-explanatory)
understanding is measured in terms of “how well it approximates
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the cognitive benefits provided by knowing a correct and good ex-
planation” [Khalifa 2013: 166].
Before moving on, let us briefly reflect on exactly what standard
Khalifa has in mind here. Given that understanding comes in degrees
and given that we attribute understanding outright6, the following
three options suggest themselves:
(1) Explanation sets the standard for maximal understanding. En-
joying the cognitive benefits of knowing a correct and good ex-
planation is tantamount to having the highest degree of under-
standing.
(2) Explanation sets the standard for attributions of outright under-
standing. Enjoying the cognitive benefits of knowing a correct
and good explanation marks the threshold for the degree of
understanding that is needed for an outright attribution of un-
derstanding to come out true.
(3) Explanation sets the standard for minimal understanding. En-
joying the cognitive benefits of knowing a correct and good ex-
planation is tantamount to having the lowest positive degree of
understanding.
It is not hard to see that neither (2) nor (3) are plausible candidates
for Khalifa here. After all, Lipton’s examples show not only that one
can have a non-zero degree of understanding of the relevant phenom-
ena without knowing a correct and good explanation, but also that
people can be attributed outright understanding of these phenomena
without such knowledge. In Lipton’s Galileo example, for instance,
appreciation of the thought experiment affords one understanding of
why gravitational acceleration is independent of mass. That is to say,
the sentence ‘One understands the independence of gravitational ac-
celeration and mass’ is true in the context of Lipton’s discussion of
the case. Given, additionally, that in this context an outright attri-
bution of understanding is true only if one has a non-zero degree of
understanding, it follows that one must also have a non-zero degree
of understanding of the relevant phenomenon.
6 When I use the term ‘outright’ in ‘outright attribution of understanding’ and
similar constructions, I mean ‘not involving degrees’. For instance, assertions of
statements of the form ‘S understands P’ are outright attributions of understand-
ing. In contrast, assertions of statements of the form ‘S understands P to degree d’,
‘S1 understands P better than S2’ are not.
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The kind of standard Khalifa must have in mind is thus (1), that
explanation sets the standard for maximal understanding. Notice
that this also fits nicely with his talk of correct and good explana-
tions constituting the ideal of understanding. After all, it is indepen-
dently plausible that understanding is ideal when possessed to the
highest degree. In order to provide further support for his thesis,
Khalifa goes on to argue that understanding of a phenomenon via
knowing some explanation is always better than the understanding
of the phenomenon without explanation.
4.2 . . . In Trouble
Unfortunately, there are a couple of problems with Khalifa’s account.
One arises from a consideration Khalifa himself considers at a dif-
ferent point in the paper: that knowledge of correct and good ex-
planations might be insufficient for understanding. To return to the
independence of gravitational acceleration and mass, consider a stu-
dent who has read and has since memorised that gravitational ac-
celeration depends on net forces acting on an object rather than on
mass and that, as a result, gravitational acceleration is independent
of mass. It is often argued that this student knows a correct and
good explanation of the phenomenon at issue but cannot plausibly
be said to understand the independence of gravitational acceleration
from mass. Khalifa replies that understanding comes in degrees and
that while the student has some positive degree of understanding, he
could have better understanding of it in virtue of knowing further
details, better explanations, etc. [Khalifa 2013: 166]
Now, while I find Khalifa’s response plausible, it does not sit com-
fortably with the earlier idea that knowledge of a correct and good
explanation constitutes the ideal and thus the highest degree of un-
derstanding. After all, the student in this case knows a correct and
good explanation of the independence of gravitational acceleration
and mass. By the earlier idea, then, the student has attained the
highest degree of understanding, whilst, according to the present re-
sponse, he hasn’t.
It might be pointed out on behalf of Khalifa that there is no need
to take the ideal of understanding to consist in knowledge of any old
explanation that is good and correct. Instead, the demands on ex-
planations could be raised. One plausible suggestion here is that at-
taining the highest degree of understanding a phenomenon requires
knowledge of the best and most complete correct explanation of the
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phenomenon. On this account, since the student knows a good and
correct explanation of the phenomenon at hand, he continues to have
some degree of understanding of it. At the same time, since he does
not know the best and most complete correct explanation of it, he
falls short of the ideal, which gives Khalifa exactly what he needs.
This move does not avoid the second problem, which arises from
the fact that knowing some explanation of a phenomenon does not
enable one to discount alternative explanations of the phenomenon.
For instance, suppose that, at t1, our student is told that gravita-
tional acceleration depends on net forces acting on an object and has
thereby come by a correct and good explanation of the phenomenon.
A little later on, at t2, she is presented with an alternative explanation
of the very same phenomenon, the Aristotelian, say. Without any fur-
ther knowledge, she will be unable to decide which of the two expla-
nations to accept. That said, if our student subsequently, at t3, learns
about Galileo’s thought experiment, she can dismiss the Aristotelian
explanation of gravitational acceleration. It is highly plausible that, at
t3, she has a better understanding of gravitational acceleration than
she did at t1. Still her knowledge of a correct and good explanation
of the phenomenon is the same at t1 and t3. At both t1 and t3, our
student knows that gravitational acceleration depends on net forces
acting on an object. The knowledge that she has come by in the mean-
time, that according to Aristotle, gravitational acceleration depends
on mass and that this can independently be shown to be impossible,
is not part of the explanation of the phenomenon. It comes to light,
then, that non-explanatory knowledge can improve understanding
that comes in the form of knowledge of explanations.
One might again say that the problem here is that the explanation
our student knows may not be the best and is certainly not complete.
Even if this is true of our toy case, the underlying point remains un-
affected. To see this let, let e1 and e2 be complete explanations of a
given phenomenon, P. Suppose e1 not only complete but also correct
and in fact the best explanation of P. At t1, S is told and thereupon
comes to know that e1 explains P. Subsequently, at t2, S is presented
with the prima facie equally plausible alternative e2. Without further
information, S will be unable to dismiss e2. After all, even the best
explanations may not wear their seal of quality on their sleeves. How-
ever, when at t3, S learns all about an impossibility result concerning
e2, she is finally in a position to dismiss one of the two explanations.
Again, it is no less plausible here than in the above case that the
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agent’s understanding at t3 is better than at t1. However, again, the
additional information is not part of the correct, complete and best
explanation (e1) of the phenomenon. As a result, the improvement
of S’s understanding at t3 compared to t1 is owed to the acquisition
of additional non-explanatory knowledge. Thus even if we raise the
standards for the ideal of understanding to knowledge of an expla-
nation that is not only correct and good but even complete and best,
knowledge of such an explanation is still compatible with improve-
ment of understanding. If so, Khalifa is mistaken. Explanation does
not constitute the ideal of understanding.
Before moving on, I would like to spend a few moments on a
contrary argument by Khalifa that, in the case of Galileo’s thought
experiment, there will be some explanation such that knowing this
explanation entails having the information provided by the thought
experiment. Having pointed out that Galileo’s thought experiment
in essence shows that a certain kind of explanation of gravitational
acceleration (in terms of mass) is incorrect, he states the core idea of
his argument in the following passage:
Let critical information be true beliefs that potential expla-
nations are incorrect. Then knowing an explanation re-
quires critical information. Specifically, true beliefs falling
short of knowledge are generally thought to be lucky, and
critical information helps to mitigate that luck. For in-
stance, if someone has no way of ruling out some other
underlying cause of a patient’s symptoms, at best he has
luckily guessed the cause of those symptoms, but he does
not know. Similarly, if someone knows the correct expla-
nation of acceleration (e.g. that acceleration is a result of
the net forces acting on an object), then she should be
able to rule out rival explanations, such as the mass hy-
pothesis, or else she merely has guessed luckily. So if an
explanation provides someone with explanatory knowl-
edge, she also possesses critical information. Presumably,
better explanations rule out more rival hypotheses, and
thus convey a lot of critical information.
[Khalifa 2013: 173-4]
With the above considerations in play, it is not hard to see where
Khalifa’s argument goes astray. Contrary to what he claims, knowing
an explanation does not require true beliefs that potential alternative
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explanations are incorrect. This is especially clear when the relevant
knowledge is acquired via testimony. When an agent acquires knowl-
edge of a certain explanation via testimony from one source and later
is offered an alternative (prima facie equally plausible) explanation
by a different (equally trustworthy) source, the agent cannot dismiss
the alternative explanation just on the basis of the fact that she be-
lieves the initial explanation to be true.7
5 An Alternative Account
It has become clear that there are serious difficulties with manipula-
tionism and explanationism, both in their classical and more recent
incarnations. That said, I do believe that there are important insights
on both sides and the account I favour incorporates a number of
them. First, however, I would like to give a brief characterisation of a
central notion in my account, viz. the notion of phenomenon.
5.1 Phenomena
Metaphysically, phenomena form a rather heterogenous bunch: per-
sons (Barack Obama), objects (Planet Earth), events (The Big Bang),
processes (the rise of the Roman Empire), instantiations of properties
and relations (the independence of mass and acceleration) all qualify.
And, of course, this list remains incomplete.
Crucially, phenomena must be actual in a relevant sense. Obama
and Planet Earth exist at the actual world. The Big Bang occurs at
the actual world as does the rise of the Roman Empire. Mass and
acceleration instantiate the independence relation at the actual world.
This is why they may count as phenomena. In contrast, Obama’s
twin sister and the 28th planet of our solar system do not exist at the
7 Compare also Kripke’s dogmatism paradox:
(1) Φ
(2) If Φ, then any future evidence against Φ is misleading.
(3) Hence, any future evidence against Φ is misleading.
It is now widely acknowledged among epistemologists that even if one knows Φ,
one need not therefore also believe that any future evidence against Φ is mislead-
ing. After all, acquisition of new evidence concerning Φ changes one’s epistemic
position towards Φ, which might undermine one’s knowledge of Φ, even if this
evidence is in fact misleading. The same is true of explanations. Even if one now
knows that e explains P, this does not require one to believe that any alternative
explanation of P that future scientific research may produce is incorrect.
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actual world. Creatio ex nihilo does not occur in actuality and neither
does the rise of the Finnish Empire in the 20th century. Mass and
acceleration do not instantiate the dependence relation in the actual
world. That’s why they do not count as phenomena.
Doesn’t the metaphysical heterogeneity of phenomena render a
uniform account of understanding problematic? Shouldn’t we of-
fer separate accounts for different kinds of phenomena? Fortunately,
there is reason to think that this won’t be necessary. After all, for ev-
ery phenomenon, no matter its metaphysical nature, there is a set of
true propositions that describes it (henceforth its “description”). For
instance, in the case of Earth, its description includes true proposi-
tions about its size and shape, its composition, etc. In addition, there
is a set of true proposition describing its place in a broader nexus of
phenomena, which we may call its “story”. In the case of Earth, its
story includes true propositions concerning its position in our solar
system, its movement around the sun, etc. Finally, let’s call the union
of a phenomenon’s description and story, its “full account”. If un-
derstanding of a given phenomenon is taken to be a relation between
agents and phenomena, it is hard to see how a uniform account could
be forthcoming. On the other hand, if understanding is cashed out
as a relation between agents and full accounts of phenomena (or rel-
evant subsets thereof), the prospect for a uniform account of under-
standing even of metaphysically heterogenous kinds of phenomena
start to look much brighter again.8,9
5.2 Degrees of Understanding
Early accounts of understanding have tended to focus mainly on out-
right understanding. That is to say, they have ventured to give an
account of the state one is in when a statement of the form ‘A under-
stands P’ is true of one. In contrast, both Wilkenfeld and especially
Khalifa are acutely aware that understanding comes in degrees and
8 Note that the same goes for knowledge. It is widely agreed that knowledge is a
relation between an agent and a proposition. As a result, there is no reason to think
that a uniform account of knowledge about metaphysically diverse phenomena
will be problematic.
9 It is common practice in the epistemology literature to distinguish between
two types of understanding, to wit, propositional understanding, which takes indi-
vidual propositions as its objects and objectual understanding the objects of which
are “bodies of information” [Kvanvig 2003: 191]. Given the above characterisa-
tion of phenomena, it is easy to see that the proposed account of understanding
phenomena qualifies as an account of objectual understanding.
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venture to give an account of what it takes for an agent to have a
certain degree of understanding. I think this is an important im-
provement. As will be become clear in due course, I take degrees of
understanding to be more fundamental than outright understanding
in the sense that we first need an account of degrees of understand-
ing in order to be able to give an account of outright understanding.
The tendency in the literature to start with an account of outright
understanding and build an account of degrees of understanding on
top of it, which effectively amounts to the project of first identifying
a minimal threshold for what it takes to understand a phenomenon
and then account for higher degrees of understanding, is one of the
fundamental errors in the literature. The fact that so many accounts
face an overintellectualisation worry, that they set the bar for under-
standing too high, is just a symptom of this mistake.
In fact, I think that Khalifa is right to characterise degrees of un-
derstanding starting from an ideal rather than from a minimal thresh-
old. His problem is that he identifies the wrong ideal. My alternative
proposal is departs from the following intuitively highly plausible
idea: knowing everything there is to know about a phenomenon is
understanding it as well as it can be understood. In other words,
the idea is that to have fully comprehensive knowledge of the full ac-
count of the phenomenon (henceforth simply “fully comprehensive
knowledge of the phenomenon” for short) is to have maximal under-
standing of it.
While this idea goes a long way towards capturing the ideal of
understanding, there is reason to think that it needs one further re-
finement. To see why, let’s first consider the case of an agent, A,
who knows the following set, Γ, of propositions about an event, E,
in which the application of a sample of a substance causes a piece of
litmus paper to change colours from blue to red: (p1) the application
of a sample, s, of a certain kind of substance to a certain piece of blue
litmus paper caused the litmus paper to turn red; (p2) applications of
acidic substances, and only of acidic substances, to blue litmus paper
cause blue litmus paper to turn red; (p3) s is a sample of an acidic
substance; and (p4) application of s caused the piece of blue litmus
paper to turn red because s is a sample of an acidic substance (p1
because p3).
What is the state of A’s understanding of E? Ordinarily, we would
expect the answer to this question to be “not bad”. But now suppose
that A knows each pi ∈ Γ, via testimony from a different source. To
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make things even clearer, suppose that, for each pi ∈ Γ, A had been
told pi in a different language. At present A has not yet translated
them all into one language. How would we assess A’s understanding
of E now? Probably quite a bit less positively. While A has some
knowledge about E, A’s knowledge is entirely unconnected and so A
has little to no understanding of E.
Note that it is not clear that adding further knowledge, perhaps
of propositions describing the connections between the members of
Γ, will solve the problem. To see this, suppose that we allow A to
have ever more knowledge about E until he has fully comprehen-
sive knowledge of E. At the same time, suppose that A knows each
member of the full account of E via testimony from different sources,
where each source testifies in a different language. Let’s assume,
as we may, that A masters all of these languages. In that case, A
has fully comprehensive knowledge of E. At the same time, A un-
derstands little more than he did when he first came to know the
members of Γ, at least so long as A has not done the translation yet.
He still only has a bunch of unconnected knowledge.10
Let us say that an agent’s fully comprehensive knowledge about
some phenomenon, P, is maximally well-connected when the basing
relations that obtain between the agent’s beliefs about P reflect the
agent’s knowledge about the explanatory and support relations that
obtain between the members of the full account of P. For instance,
in the above case, when A has fully comprehensive knowledge of E,
he will know that p1 and p2 entail p3 and that p4 embodies a correct
and good (causal) explanation of p1 in terms of p3. In order to have
maximal understanding of E, our agent must not only know p1 – p4,
but also believe p3 based on the fact that p1 and p2 entail p3 and
p4 based on the fact that p3 constitutes a correct and good (causal)
explanation of p1. The reason why A has little to no understanding of
E when he acquires each item of knowledge from a different source
in a different language is that his knowledge about E is minimally
well-connected: none of the support relations that he knows to obtain
between members of the full account of E is reflected in the basing
relations that obtain between his beliefs.
With these points in play, here is my account of maximal under-
standing
10 Note that the point about different languages does not play any substantive
role in this argument. It is simply meant make perspicuous the possibility of having
unconnected knowledge.
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Maximal Understanding (Max-U)
If one has fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected
knowledge a phenomenon P, then one has maximal under-
standing of P.11
Notice that Max-U will allow us to avoid two difficulties that we
encountered earlier. First, it accommodates the idea that our om-
niscient agent, O, is an omni-understanding agent. Or, to be more
precise, O will be omni-understanding provided that his knowledge
is also maximally well-connected, a condition that, I assume, we took
as read in the original description of the case.12 O is an agent who
11 Since the account is stated in terms of knowledge, it presupposes that under-
standing is a form of knowledge (U=K). It may be worth noting that, for the pur-
poses of this paper at least, this presupposition is inessential. To see this, notice,
first, that the central aim of this paper is to argue that my account is preferable to its
two most prominent competitors in the philosophy of science literature (explana-
tionism and manipulationism) as it can steer clear of the problems they encounter.
Notice, next, that this aim can be achieved even on variants of my account that do
not presuppose U=K. Consider, for instance, the following two variants of Max-U:
Max-U’
If one has fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected justified
beliefs about a phenomenon P, then one has maximal understanding
of P. (The variants of Deg-U and Out-U (see below) are as expected.)
Max-U”
If one has fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected justified
true beliefs about a phenomenon P, then one has maximal understand-
ing of P. (The variants of Deg-U and Out-U (see below) are as ex-
pected.)
Neither Max-U” nor Max-U” presupposes U=K. Max-U’ construes understand-
ing as a form of justified belief (U=JB), Max-U” as a form of justified true belief
(U=JTB). At the same time, it is easy to see that both variants enjoy the benefits
of my account vis-à-vis explanationism and manipulationism. The paper’s central
aim can thus be achieved just as well if my knowledge based account is abandoned
in favour of either variant. For that reason the presupposition of U=K is inessential
for the purposes of this paper. Finally, note that most epistemologists who reject
U=K accept either some version of U=JB or of U=JTB. As a result, there is reason
to believe that my presupposition of U=K is not epistemologically problematic.
12 Note if O’s knowledge is not maximally well-connected it is not clear that O
will also be maximally understanding. If O’s beliefs are minimally well-connected
in the way A’s beliefs were in the above case, it would seem that O, too, under-
stands little to nothing at all. That said, it is actually not clear that O could be both
omniscient and yet fail to have maximally well-connected knowledge. To see this,
consider a proposition p that, let’s suppose, O knows that p based on testimony
from T. Since O is omniscient, O would also know that he knows that p based
on testimony from T. Now suppose that T knows that p because T saw that p.
Since O is omniscient, O would also have to know that T saw that p. However, it is
not clear that O could know that p based only on testimony from T, when he also
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has fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected knowledge
of the full account of any phenomenon whatsoever. So, by Max-U, O
has maximal understanding of all phenomena and does so whether
or not, like O, he happens to be passive by nature.
Second, it avoids the problem that besets Khalifa’s explanatory
idealism. To see this recall the case of the student who, at t1, is told
and thereupon comes to know the best correct and complete expla-
nation of a given phenomenon, P, subsequently, at t2, learns of an
alternative, prima facie equally plausible explanation of P and, at
t3 is finally able to dismiss the alternative thanks to a thought ex-
periment like Galileo’s that shows the alternative explanation to be
impossible. Explanatory idealism cannot accommodate the plausi-
ble idea that our student’s understanding improves between t1 and
t3. After all, at t1, our student already knows the best correct and
complete explanation of P and has thus reached the ideal. In con-
trast, Max-U faces no particular problem here. After all, our student
acquires new knowledge about the story of P between t1 and t3, in-
cluding that there is an alternative explanation of P (t2) and that the
explanation, although prima facie no less plausible than the one he
already had cannot be true after all (t3). Hence, at t1, he did not have
fully comprehensive knowledge of the full account of P and so, at t1,
he had not reached the ideal.
With Max-U in place, I want to suggest that the quality of one’s
understanding of a phenomenon can then be measured in terms of
approximations to maximal understanding—i.e. fully comprehensive
and maximally well-connected knowledge—of it.
Degrees of Understanding (Deg-U)
Degree of understanding of P is a function of distance from
fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected knowledge
of P: the closer one approximates fully comprehensive and
maximally well-connected knowledge of P, the higher one’s de-
gree of understanding of P.13
knows that T saw that p. After all, O state would then be irrational in a way that is
not evidently compatible with his omniscience.
13 It is tempting to think that degrees of understanding depend on degrees of
breadth and depth of understanding and that approximations to fully comprehen-
sive knowledge measure breadth of understanding and approximations to maxi-
mally well-connected knowledge measure depth of understanding. That said, I will
not pursue the project of offering a precise account of degrees of understanding in
any more detail here. Fortunately, I don’t have to, at least not for the purposes
of this paper. Recall that the main aim here is to offer an account that compares
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Deg-U offers an account of degrees of understanding without impos-
ing a minimal threshold for understanding. It is thus ideally suited to
avoid the overintellectualisation worries that so many accounts which
aim to specify such a threshold encounter.14
Deg-U does serve to handle the case of the story-teller T, which
posed a problem for Wilkenfeld’s version of manipulationism. Recall
that T uses her imagination to invent a story according to which the
Indian elephant evolved from a species of marine pygmy elephants
that used to inhabit the bottom of the Indian Ocean. Recall also
that, intuitively, this did not advance T’s understanding of the evo-
lution of the Indian elephant. Deg-U can explain why. After all, T’s
use of her imagination in this case does not deliver new knowledge
about the evolution of the Indian elephant. In consequence, T does
not advance in the direction of fully comprehensive and maximally
well-connected knowledge of this phenomenon. Given that this is so,
Deg-U predicts that T’s use of her imagination in this case does not
improve her understanding of the evolution of the Indian elephant.
Thus, the present account steers clear of this problem, too.
5.3 Outright Understanding
Of course, the question remains how we are to account for outright
understanding. Here manipulationists have a couple of core insights.
First, I think that it is here that the core manipulationist idea—that
understanding involves being able to do something—is of relevance.
The second insight resides in Wilkenfeld’s observation that outright
attributions of understanding afford a contextualist semantics.
In order to account for outright understanding, I would like to
first connect the second insight with Max-U and Deg-U. Max-U and
Deg-U give us an account of maximal understanding in terms of
fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected knowledge and
favourably with its rivals on both the manipulationist and the explanationist side.
Now notice first that, while everyone agrees that understanding comes in degrees
and allows for evaluation in terms of depth and breadth, no one has offered any-
thing that comes even close to a detailed account of degrees of understanding. For
that reason, my account is not at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its explanationist and
manipulationist rivals on this front. Second, as will become clear in due course,
my account can avoid the problems that beset its rivals without recourse to a pre-
cise account of degrees of understanding. In consequence, I can arguably claim an
advantage over both manipulationism and explanationism for my account.
14 I don’t mean to suggest that there might not be a minimal threshold for un-
derstanding. Again, even if there is one, for the purposes of this paper, it won’t be
necessary to specify it.
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of degrees of understanding in terms of distances to fully compre-
hensive and maximally well-connected knowledge. My suggestion is
to incorporate the contextualist idea in terms of a contextually vari-
able threshold of distance from maximal understanding. If one is
close enough to fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected
knowledge of a given phenomenon to surpass the threshold in a
given context, then one can truly be attributed understanding of the
phenomenon in that context.
The manipulationist’s first insight, that understanding involves
being able to do something, can then be used to account for how the
threshold is set. The idea here is that the threshold is set by a task
concerning the phenomenon such that one is close enough to fully
comprehensive knowledge of a given phenomenon just in case one
would successfully perform this task, if one were to have any the
relevant skills needed to do this. In other words,
Outright Understanding (Out-U)
“S understands P” is true in context c if and only if S ap-
proximates fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected
knowledge of P closely enough to be such that S would (be
sufficiently likely to) successfully perform any task concerning
P determined by c, if, in addition, S were to have the skills
needed to do so and to exercise them in suitably favourable
conditions.15
15 It might be thought that the subjunctive conditional here is problematic. After
all, as Robert Shope [1978] has argued at length, biconditionals featuring a sub-
junctive are prone to what he calls “the conditional fallacy”. In the simplest case,
the biconditional is of the form ‘p ↔ (q r)’. In one version of the fallacy (V1),
p is true and q is not, but if q were true, q’s being true (and/or r’s being true)
would lead to p’s no longer being true. In another version of the fallacy (V2), p
is true and q is not, but if q were to be true, this would lead to r’s no longer be-
ing true. Fortunately, there is reason to think that Out-U does not fall prey to the
conditional fallacy. Concerning V1, note that we can add further conditions to the
antecedent of the subjunctive such that they entail that the left-hand side of the bi-
conditional is true. A biconditional of the form ‘p↔ ((p ∧ q) r)’ will evidently
be safe from V1. In the case of Out-U, we can require that the context remains the
same and S approximates fully comprehensive knowledge to the same degree and
in the same way. Since whether or not an agent surpasses the threshold depends
only on the context and the degree and way of approximation to fully comprehen-
sive knowledge, adding the above conditions to the antecedent guarantees that if
the antecedent of the subjunctive is true, the left-hand side of Out-U is true also.
Concerning V2, note that if the corresponding conditional is necessarily true, again
there is no need to worry: ‘p↔ ((p∧ q) r)’ will evidently be safe from V2 when
‘p ↔ 2((p ∧ q) → r)’ is true also. In Out-U, the addition of the proviso that con-
ditions be suitably favourable arguably ensures that the corresponding conditional
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Notice that again there is excellent reason to think that Out-U will
not fall prey to the overintellectualisation problem. After all, the
contextually determined tasks may be very easy. In certain contexts,
for instance, when talking about small children, knowing enough to
be able to answer a set of fairly easy multiple choice questions may
do the trick.
Notice that Out-U can accommodate the idea that outright at-
tributions of understanding are true of our omniscient but passive
cogniser, O, for all phenomena and in any context. After all, while O
does not have the ability to perform any tasks whatsoever, this is not
due to a lack of knowledge but due to a lack of additional skills that
would be needed to carry out these tasks. For that reason, O does
know enough about P to be such that O would (be sufficiently likely
to) successfully perform any task concerning P whatsoever, if O were
to have the skills needed to do so and to exercise them in suitably
favourable conditions. Out-U thus predicts that outright attributions
of understanding are true ofO, for all phenomena and in any context.
For the same reason, Out-U is compatible with another poten-
tially problematic case for those who take attributions of understand-
ing to be task-relative, to wit, the case of dyslexic agents. Wilkenfeld
states the case in the following passage:
Consider a dyslexic student. Universities (at least in the
United States) make special allowances for students with
such conditions as dyslexia precisely because it is recog-
nized that they cannot always perform the tasks we come
to expect of people who understand the material. One
might be cautiously optimistic that there are other tasks
one could ask them to perform such that their perfor-
mance would be reflective of genuine understanding, but
it would be foolhardy to claim that this is necessarily or
even always actually the case.
[Wilkenfeld 2013: 1012]
Any account of attributions of understanding that ties them too close-
is necessarily true. That said, it is in principle possible to avoid stating Out-U in
terms of a subjunctive conditional. One alternative strategy appeals to the notion
of an epistemic duplicate and claims that ‘S understands P’ is true in a context just
in case some epistemic duplicate of S would successfully perform the tasks deter-
mined by context. (Thanks to XXX for pointing this out to me.) I decided to opt
for the subjunctive version because it strikes me as most intuitive and more elegant
certainly than the “epistemic duplicate” version.
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ly to abilities to perform certain tasks will struggle to do justice to
understanding in dyslexic agents. Out-U, in contrast, handles the
case with remarkable ease: dyslexic agents may understand a certain
phenomenon even if they are unable to perform any task whatsoever
that would be reflective of it. They will do so whenever they know
enough about it to be such that they would (be sufficiently likely
to) successfully perform the contextually determined set of tasks if
they were to have the skills needed to do so and to exercise them in
suitably favourable conditions. Since dyslexic agents often enough
satisfy this condition, by Out-U, they can truly be attributed under-
standing in the relevant contexts.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have outlined a novel account of understanding.
At its basis is an account of degrees of understanding, Max-U and
Deg-U, according to which fully comprehensive and maximally well-
connected knowledge about a phenomenon constitutes maximal un-
derstanding and degrees of understanding are measured in terms of
distances to maximal understanding. This account of degrees of un-
derstanding is used to give a contextualist semantics for attributions
of outright understanding, Out-U, according to which, roughly, an
attribution of outright understanding is true if and only if one knows
enough to perform a contextually relevant task. I have argued that
this account compares favourably with the two main alternative ap-
proaches to understanding in the literature, manipulationism and ex-
planationism, as it can secure the benefits of both accounts without
incurring the costs of either.
While there is thus reason to believe that the proposed account
carries some promise, some issues remain unresolved. One concerns
the relation between understanding and explanation. Even Lipton,
who acknowledges that one can understand without explanations,
grants that there is a close link between understanding and expla-
nation. In his view “explanations set the standard for what kind
of knowledge counts as understanding” [Lipton 2009: 54]. On the
present account this does not appear to be the case. Given that this is
so, the question remains whether the present account can make sense
of the link between understanding and explanation. While I do not
have a definitive answer to it, here is a line that it might be worth
pursuing at this stage. Maximal understanding of a phenomenon re-
quires knowledge of maximally complete and correct explanations of
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it. After all, one will not know everything there is to know about a
phenomenon if one misses out on a maximally complete and correct
explanation of it. Now the crucial hypothesis is that to surpass a
certain degree of understanding of a phenomenon, one must know
explanations of it. If this is correct, then understanding above a cer-
tain degree of quality will require explanation. The link between
understanding and explanation would be restored.
Another loose end concerns the idea that understanding requires
knowledge. True, we have seen some reason to favour knowledge
based accounts of understanding over accounts that allow for repre-
sentations of all kinds, including imagination-based ones. However,
one might think that even if the range of representations that can
constitute one’s understanding has to be more restrictive than that,
it need not be so restrictive as to require knowledge. For instance,
one might think that understanding can be constituted for instance
by justified belief or justified true belief about a certain phenomenon
(see n.11). I think that there is good reason to stick to a knowledge
based account of understanding, as I think that only a knowledge
based account can make sense of intuitions about comparative de-
grees of understanding and give a satisfactory account of the aims of
scientific and ordinary inquiry. However, I will leave the argument
for another occasion.
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